Determinism in Spinoza’s Work and Determination in the Technical Object

To analyze and discuss what determinism is for Spinoza is supposed to understand what this concept means and frame it within a larger thought: pantheism. In the first instance and in a very general and erroneous way, it can be supposed that what is determined in Spinoza is something already given and that there is no way out of it; however, as we will see throughout this essay, it supposes the opposite insofar as it is understood that said concept rests on God and his infinite modes. Therefore, this essay is composed of two parts: the first aims at analyzing and discussing what determinism is for Spinoza, taking into account his work Ethics demonstrated according to the geometrical order (2000). As a second point, I propose to take the concept of determinism according to Spinoza and extend it to the plane of technology; that is, to answer whether the technological object, derived in the first place from man, is determined by its function.

God, Source of the Determinate

In the first place, Spinoza in 1P26 (1) considers God, of infinite attributes, as the only one who can determine a thing to act; that is to say, that God is the efficient cause of both the existence and the essence of things. But, this proposition about God, beyond the simplicity that it seems to keep, reveals the complexity of his thought about God, as the efficient cause of all things and how these, whether infinite or finite, being already determined, strive as far as possible to preserve their being, as later, in 3P7.

God, as Spinoza maintains, is the efficient cause, and everything that is, is in God and without him, nothing can be conceived, so that God is not the only creator of all things, but everything is in God. However, that does not mean that the essence of things is God since, as he explains in 2P10, God does not belong to the essence of things since there is a difference between the conceived object and that which is given, the thing is put in or, if taken away, the thing is taken away. Therefore, he goes on to explain in 2P10, the essence of things is not God but the attributes of him, understanding the attributes as that which the understanding perceives of the substance as constitutive of its essence.

Considering the above, things, and their essences, are determined by God. But this does not mean that God determines, directly, all things. Spinoza continues in 2P13, concerning bodies, that these are determined (at rest or in motion) by another body, which was also determining and so on to infinity, so that God, as the first cause, is the one who determines everything, although he does not do it directly.

Counterposing this point, and observing that there may be a limitation as to objects and their determination, it is observed that, on the one hand, things cannot be different from the way they are, as he explains in 1P33, and on the other hand, that from the divine nature it follows that there are infinite things in infinite ways. On the first point he observes in 2P33 that things could not have been produced by God in a way or in an order different from the way they have been and that, therefore, everything has been determined by the necessity of God’s nature to exist and act in a certain way. He goes on to comment that the contingent is rather a defect in our knowledge, that we are ignorant of the order of causes.

But does this mean that everything is already given? Yes and no. Everything is given, and determined, insofar as there is no contingency, but within the infinite modes that follow from the divine nature, nothing is given insofar as, within the infinitude of things and the finiteness of our knowledge, it is impossible to know these infinite modes. In addition to the above, as Spinoza comments in 3P6, each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to persevere in its being, so that the determination of things depends both on God and on the essence of things, which are the attributes of God.

The Determination on Things

While within the infinitude of God everything is determined (though not limited) it remains to be known how things remain determined in themselves. Spinoza, in 3P6, writes that each thing, insofar as it is in itself, strives to preserve its being. Thus, it is not God who continues to determine things, but the very essence of them and their actual essence. So, if there is an effort in the very essence of things, it is because there is the possibility, in its infinite modes, that it can change its determined nature.

However, this change to its determinate nature does not come by the thing itself, but is external to itself or, as he mentions in 3P4, nothing can be destroyed except by an external cause, which itself derives in its individuality. Therefore, as Solé (2004) mentions, the individual or thing is, in principle, an eternal truth that depends only on God and, therefore, is determined directly or indirectly to him, but already in its individuality, with its essence, is where it strives to preserve its determination. Within its own individuality and determination, it can only be destroyed by an external cause but, outside its determination, this external cause can only be of its own nature, as Spinoza’s notion of infinitude indicates.

That said, the determinate in Spinoza is something that is given in an initial way in God, where the essence is given from his attributes, leading to a determination that, within his infinite modes, makes contingency non-existent but which they strive to preserve. Moreover, as noted above, this determination does not indicate that something is already limited or predestined, but that within these infinite modes, it remains to be to what is determined remains to be clarified.

Determination in the Technical Object

The determination that Spinoza expounds is observed in a metaphysical and general way, punctuating where it should in questions about the soul. However, what happens with those technical objects that, beyond the determination conceived by God, are already given by the human being? In the first instance, one could consider that they are already determined by the human insofar as everything is determined by another; however, he does not explain beyond a use that the technical object can exceed; that is, he does not consider a hypertelia of the technical object.

Returning to Simondon (2017), the hypertelia of the technical object occurs when it exceeds the purposes for which it was conceived or thought; that is, for example, that currently, the hypertelia of social networks have exceeded the communication for which they were initially conceived and giving now an ecosystem with a vast complexity. It could be said, then, that a technical object is not determined by the human who creates it, but that it achieves its autonomy after its development. But, as we observed in 1P33, the contingent is associated with ignorance of the order of things, so that if a technical object exhibits contingent behavior, it is a manifestation that is hidden from us of what we conceive. Whether they are evolutionary algorithms, machine learning algorithms that create their own rules, behaviors derived from communication in networks, everything derived from the technical object is nothing more than something that we fail to visualize at the moment of creation.

But beyond that, the determination of the technical object is not only given by the one who creates the object, but also by the one who makes use of it. A machine, for example, whose function is determined to perform operations, can be determined differently by the user from the one who makes use of it, in the same way, that a stone can be determined both for use as a hammer and as a weapon. Thus, technical objects find a double determination in their uses and functions.

Conclusion

It can be considered that Spinoza’s vision of the determinate is negative insofar as everything is already dictated beforehand, however, as we observed above, God, in His infinite modes, is in everything and we are all in God, but this does not mean that we are not limited. God, within his infinitude, lets us glimpse that determination is also given by an infinitude, which can only be limited by something external and similar. That said, the determination to which we are subject is infinite and, therefore, incommensurable within our finite reasoning.

We, as individuals, are determined to be and such determination is given by God, either directly or indirectly. Determination, therefore, is something for which it is already given to each thing and individual and seeks to maintain.

For the case of the technical object, we observe that, contrary to what is said by thinkers like Simondon or Yuk Hui, it is determined and given, so it is not possible to observe a contingent behavior or function. The determination of its function is given both by the attributes of God and by the determination that we humans give it, both by the one who creates it and by the one who intends to make different use of the technical object, in other words, every technical object is doubly determined.

References

Simondón, G. (2017). Sobre la Técnica (M. Martínez & P. Rodriguez, Trads.; 1ra ed.). Cactus.

Solé, M. J. (2004). Individuos y totalidad en Spinoza: De la tensión metafísica al problema político. Universidad de Buenos Aires.

Spinoza, B. (2000). Ética demostrada según el orden geométrico. (A. Domínguez, Ed. y Trad.). Trotta.